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IMPARTIAL PATENTS 
Clarisa Long* 
Response to: Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 
Colum. L. Rev. 207 (2011). 
I. THE PARTIAL PATENT PROPOSAL 
Over the past decade or more, a rising sense of dissatisfaction with patent 
law has begun to creep across the patent community.1 A number of factors no 
doubt have contributed to this sense of dissatisfaction, among them the 
perception that patents are too often being enforced by “trolls” (if you don’t 
like them) or “nonpracticing entities” (if you want to remain neutral).2 
Professor Parchomovsky and Mr. Mattioli propose a solution in which they 
create two new forms of patent protection that they call “quasi-p tents” and 
“semi-patents”—or generically, “partial patents.”3 Partial patents are designed 
to be cheaper to obtain than existing alternatives, but an owner of a quasi-
patent would be able to enforce that patent only against direct competitors, 
whereas in the case of a semi-patent, an inventor would have heavier burd ns 
of disclosure.4 
The authors are to be praised for grappling with a difficult problem within 
the patent system and proposing creative solutions. Their proposed solutions 
do not use the force of the state to strip patentees of existing entitlements, but 
rely instead on would-be patentees to opt in to new forms of protection. While 
 
*  Max Mendel Shaye Professor of Intellectual Property Law, Columbia Law School. © 2011. 
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1. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy ch. 5, at 1–10 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (listing 
examples). 
2. The FTC has recently coined yet another term for entiti s that enforce patents on 
inventions they do not practice or sell in the stream of commerce: Patent Assertion Entity. Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition 8 n.5 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review). 
3. Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 207, 208 
(2011). 
4. Id. at 226–33. 
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provocative, the proposed solution of creating new forms of patent protection 
is an indirect response to the real problem, however, and has the po ential to 
create further difficulties. 
One of the problems Parchomovsky and Mattioli identify—that of 
patentees enforcing patents against defendants when the patentee is not 
producing the same product that the defendant is selling—often arises when 
the patent is overbroad. In an attempt to address the problem of patent 
overbreadth, the authors’ proposed quasi-patents would make a defendant’s 
economic status relative to the plaintiff a key element determining the 
defendant’s liability. By contrast, one of the strengths of the existing patent 
system is that an accusation of infringement focuses on the alleged conduct of 
the defendant.5 Liability does not turn on the defendant’s economic status. 
When it comes to the treatment of defendants on the basis of their 
characteristics, the patent system should remain impartial. The patent system 
should not use the defendant’s economic status as a proxy for determining if 
the plaintiff’s patent is overbroad. Part II of this Response demonstrates why 
the problem of patent overbreadth often arises. Part III shows a few pitfalls of 
using the defendant’s economic status as a proxy for patent ov rbreadth. Part 
IV points out that the problem of patent overbreadth can be addressed more 
directly. 
II. THE REAL PROBLEM: THE INVENTION-CLAIM GAP 
The problem of patent overbreadth is created by the way the patent 
system allows inventions to be claimed. The current patent system and its rules 
for claiming an invention permit the scope of a patent’s claims to exceed—
even greatly exceed—the technological problem the patentee has attempted to 
solve. 
In a patent document, the claims define the scope of protection.6 The 
name of the game for patent drafters, therefore, is to write patent claims 
worded to cover as much ground as possible. If there is no prior art that limits 
the scope of the claims to a particular use, a patentee need not confine the 
scope of her claims to a particular use. If the claims are written in just the right 
way, a clever patentee can exclude others from uses of the invention that the 
patentee did not know of at the time the patentee invented. 
Here is a simple example. Suppose Inventor Number One invents a new 
chemical compound, which she calls “Compound X.” Inventor Number One 
knows little about the practical properties of Compound X. Nonetheless, under 
patent law’s utility requirement, she must recite one real-world, nonfrivolous 
use for the invention in order for it to qualify for patent protection.7 One day 
the inventor spills Compound X on herself and realizes that it dyes cotton cloth 
blue. Even if Compound X serves as a mediocre dye at best, use as a dye 
 
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (defining an infringer as “whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented i vention”). 
6. See Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
1989) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers 
on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention.”). 
7. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (setting forth the utility requirement). 
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nonetheless constitutes a real-world, nonfrivolous use. Thus, o r intrepid 
inventor can assert this real-world use in order to fulfill the utility requirement 
for patenting. The scope of her claims, however, can cover uses other than the 
one recited to fulfill the utility requirement. Moreover, assuming there was no 
prior art to limit her claims, her claims need not be confined to—or even 
mention—the use or uses of her invention of which she is aware. Claim 1 of 
her patent would typically read: “I claim a compound of the formula” followed 
by a recitation of the chemical structure.8 
The inventor receives her patent and begins selling Compound X as a dye 
for clothes.9 Alas, Compound X is not an improvement over other dyes on the 
market, as it is not colorfast and also causes some users to have a mild allergic 
reaction. Suppose that fifteen years after the patent issues, Inventor Number 
Two purchases a bottle of Compound X and discovers that Compound X has 
tumor-shrinking properties. Inventor Number Two, having purchased the dye 
for use, has not infringed the patent because patent law’s exhaustion doctrine 
allows her to use the invention once she has purchased it.10 
Inventor Number Two would not be able to synthesize and market the 
compound herself, whether as a cancer treatment or for any other use, without 
a license from Inventor Number One because that would be a violation of 
Inventor Number One’s patent, and would not be protected by the exhaustion 
doctrine. Use of the dye as a cancer treatment likely has a higher market value 
than use as a dye, so Inventor Number One is in a powerful bargaining 
position. Because patents are bundles of strong exclusionary rights that are 
usually protected by injunctions, Inventor Number One has the power to set the 
price and the terms under which Inventor Number Two will carry out her 
invention.11 
The problem with Inventor Number One’s patent lies in the gap between 
the wording of the patent’s claims (in my example, “a compound of the 
formula . . .”) and the invention the patentee actually created (use of that 
compound as a dye).12 An invention, in the words of one commentator, is 
 
8. Assume for simplifying purposes in this hypothetical that there is only one claim in the 
patent, which would not be the case in real life, as inventors would be well-advised to have 
multiple claims covering the invention for maximum protection in the event that a challenger was 
able to get one or more claims invalidated in litiga on. The validity of a patent is judged on a 
claim-by-claim basis. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims.”). A challenger must therefore knock out all the 
claims in a patent in order to get the patent invalidated. 
9. Let us suppose that receiving regulatory approval under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act of 1938 for use of Compound X as a dye is not a problem. See 21 U.S.C. § 379e (2006) 
(governing the regulation of color additives). 
10. According to the exhaustion doctrine, an unconditional sale of a patented invention 
exhausts the patentee’s right to control the purchaser’s use of the invention. See B. Braun Med., 
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir1997) (discussing the exhaustion doctrine). 
11. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (requiring courts to 
use traditional four-factor test when determining whether to grant injunctions in patent 
infringement cases). 
12. Professor Oskar Liivak has written about this gap as well. See generally Oskar Liivak, 
Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim (Feb. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1769270 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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“simply the inventor’s own solution to some technical problem.”13 The 
invention is not always coterminous with the claims. Overbreadth becomes 
problematic when the claims give the patentee exclusionary rights to solutions 
to technical problems that the patentee did not know at the time of patenting. 
For some commentators, the invention-claim gap is a feature of the patent 
system, not a bug.14 These commentators point out that the invention-claim 
gap provides a super-reward, if you will, for inventors who create technologies 
that later inventors can build on. This is a heightened incentive to create 
pioneering inventions. For other commentators, the invention-claim gap is 
unacceptably inefficient and wasteful.15 On this second view, a patentee 
should not be able to extract rents for uses she did not invent, let alone 
research. Thus, given that the patent system is supposed to provide incentives 
to invent, the invention-claim gap produces a reward disproporti nate to the 
patentee’s actual contribution to the art. 
Although they do not frame their analysis in terms of the inv ntion-claim 
gap, Parchomovsky and Mattioli fall in the latter group of c mmentators.16 To 
solve the problem of patent overbreadth, one of their solutions would allow 
patentees to enforce their patents only against direct competitors. Qua i-patents 
attempt to address the invention-claim gap by creating two classes of 
defendants: direct competitors to the patentee, and everyone else. The authors 
implicitly treat direct competitors as constituting a proxy for parties who are 
likely to practice the patentee’s invention (as opposed to parties practicing 
technologies covered by the patentee’s claims but not the inventor’s own 
solution to a technical problem). If this proxy is robust, parties who fall into 
the invention-claim gap would not be practicing the patentee’s invention, even 
if their activity is within the scope of the patent’s claims, and thus would be 
exempt from liability. Parchomovsky and Mattioli’s quasi-patents would make 
a defendant’s economic status relative to the plaintiff a key element that 
determines its potential liability. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPARTIALITY 
The invention-claim gap is an under-discussed problem in the literature, 
and one that has been sneaking up on us for some time, so Parchomovsky and 
Mattioli’s article is timely and thought-provoking. Making the economic status 
of the defendant a key element determining liability, however, has the potential 
to create a number of unintended consequences. This Response discusses two: 
(1) the problem of strategic behavior by patentees and potential defendants, 
and (2) the potential for political capture by interest groups. 
Economic status is a suboptimal proxy for a defendant’s behavior (i.e., 
whether the defendant’s actions fall within the invention-claim gap), not least 
 
13. Id. at 6. 
14. On a related note, see generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the 
Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 (1977) (suggesting that granting a patentee broad rights over 
the invention allows for optimal downstream coordinat on of follow-on inventions). 
15. See, e.g., Liivak, supra note 12, at 42 (“By seeing the invention as a substantive concept 
the patent system can improve completeness, accuracy, and precision.”). 
16. See Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 3, at 213–19 (discussing patent overbreadth). 
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because economic status is easily manipulable. One of the existing patent 
code’s virtues is that liability under patent law does not turn on the economic 
status of the accused infringer. The importance of nondiscrimination on the 
basis of economic status in patent law cannot be understated. If the defendant’s 
economic status were an element of liability, then both the plaintiff and 
defendant would have the incentive to manipulate a legal finding of the parties’ 
economic status relative to each other. In order to determine whether the 
defendant was a direct competitor to the patentee, the court would need to 
define the relevant market. Parchomovsky and Mattioli believe that 
determinations of the parties’ economic status relative to each other will 
usually be straightforward,17 but in antitrust cases, which also call for courts to 
define markets and determine whether parties are competitors, such fact-
intensive inquiries have frequently proven thorny, contentious, and time-
consuming.18 
In order to avoid liability, potential defendants would need to anticipate 
with sufficient accuracy whether a court would deem them to be a direct 
competitor of the patentee. This may not be possible, even under the best of 
circumstances. If a risk-averse potential defendant cannot determine in advance 
whether the patent would be enforceable against it because it cannot determine 
its status relative to the patentee, then quasi-patents default to being treated the 
same as standard utility patents. 
Even if the competitive relationship between a potential defendant and a 
patentee can be determined in advance, problems remain. If a direct competit r 
wanted to infringe a quasi-patent, it could contract with a nondirect competitor 
of the patentee to make, use, or sell the allegedly infringing product, thereby 
skirting direct infringement. Under such a circumstance, could patentees bring 
suit against the direct competitor for indirect infringement? It appears unlikely. 
Under the patent statute, no party can be liable for indirect infringement unless 
direct infringement of the patent by some party has occurred, and the patentee 
would not have standing to allege direct infringement of a quasi-patent against 
a noncompetitor.19 
Similarly, patentees could collude with other entities to enforce the patent 
against defendants who would not otherwise be liable. For example, a atentee 
could effectively create the ability to enforce the patent against a 
noncompetitor by selling the patent to an entity that was a direct competitor of 
the potential defendant at a discount, in exchange for a promise by the buyer of 
 
17. See id. at 228 (“In most cases, this determination [of whether the parties are direct 
competitors] will be straightforward.”). 
18. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.) 
(“[M]arket definition is a deeply fact-intensive inquiry . . . .”); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 
F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“[D]efining the relevant market in differentiated 
product markets is likely to be a difficult task.”); see also Dennis W. Carlson, Market Definition: 
Use and Abuse 5 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div. Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. 
07-6, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/225693.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he direct determination of the level of market power is going to be 
hard no matter what definition is used.”). 
19. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 n.7 (1960) 
(“[T]here can be no contributory infringement in the absence of direct infringement.”). 
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the patent—now the new patentee20—to sue the alleged infringer and give the 
seller a portion of the proceeds if the suit succeeds. If patentees could 
manipulate the relative economic status of the parties so easily merely by 
selling the patent to a direct competitor of the alleged infringer, thus changing 
who was the patentee, this would eviscerate the limited liability that a quasi-
patent provides potential defendants. Quasi-patent holders would thus get the 
benefits of a quasi-patent up front (reduced costs and time spent prosecuting 
the patent) but could do an end run around its limitations. 
Because partial patents require patentees to opt in voluntarily, creating 
new forms of protection may not create a separating equilibrium that cabins the 
behavior of “bad types.” “Good types”—patentees who have no intention of 
taking advantage of the invention-claim gap, or of engaging in classic 
“trollish” behavior—may or may not opt in. In either case, it makes little 
difference since good types are not engaging in the kind of behavior that 
Parchomovsky and Mattioli are trying to prevent. But “bad types”—patentees 
who expect to engage in rent-extracting trollish behavior or who strategically 
withhold information in the patent prosecution process—have little incentive to 
opt into forms of protection that effectively limit their enforcement options or 
require more disclosure up front without getting significant benefits for doing 
so. Whether faster or cheaper patent prosecution, a longer term of protection, 
or other benefits that the authors propose can compensate bad types for 
forgoing the full opportunity to extract rents remains unclear.21 Alternatively, 
if bad types can escape the limitations of partial patents as I h ve described 
above, they may opt in so as to reap the benefits of such forms of protection up 
front, but then strategically avoid the costs later. 
My second concern, the potential for political capture of patent law by 
interest groups, is more conceptual. Patent law’s impartiality toward the 
economic status of defendants is a feature that has made capture by int rest 
groups more difficult.22 When compared with the copyright code, the 
difference is striking and notable. In copyright law, the success of interest 
groups in creating statutory provisions that adjust liability on the basis of status 
has been well noted.23 Such success creates conditions for further statutory 
capture by interest groups in an ever-spiraling vicious cycle.24 While 
Parchomovsky and Mattioli’s proposal would create exemption fr m liability 
 
20. A patentee includes “successors in title” to an original patent holder. 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) 
(2006). 
21. See Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 3, at 247–52 (proposing various incentives 
for patentees to receive partial patents). 
22. See Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, Fed. Law., Feb. 2008, at 44 (advocating 
against industry-specific rules in patent law). 
23. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L. 
Rev. 275, 351–52 (1989) (giving example of nonprofit libraries). A few other examples of status-
based exemptions from liability under the copyright statute include exceptions to the public 
performance right for nonprofit educational institutions, 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2), churches, id. 
§ 110(3)–(4), small shops and restaurants, id. § 110(5), agricultural organizations, id. § 110(6), 
record stores, id. § 110(7), and veterans’ organizations, id. § 110(10). 
24. See, e.g., Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 
280 (2004) (describing the development of modern copyright law as a tussle between “incumbent 
and challenger disseminators”). 
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through the form of intellectual property protection (which would in turn be 
chosen by the patentee-plaintiff), the same underlying concern applies. 
Formally building economic status as an element of liability in o the patent 
statute creates a precedent that other interest groups can build upon further 
when arguing that they too ought to be exempt from liability on the basis of 
status. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF THE INVENTION-CLAIM GAP EX ANTE 
Parchomovsky and Mattioli’s proposed solutions are ex post approaches, 
but, as they recognize, the problems they identify can also be addr ssed ex ante 
by focusing on making the patent prosecution process more rigorous.25 
The patent drafting process provides numerous opportunities for patentees 
to game the system.26 Incentives between the patentee and the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) are lopsided, as the patentee will usually c re more 
about getting the patent than the PTO will care about denying it. This is not to 
say that all patentees will care about all patent applications, but it is to say that 
in art units where examiner productivity is measured using a metric that 
includes the number of patents granted, many examiners will have little 
incentive to resist savvy and persistent patent applicants for long.27 Patentees 
have every incentive to draft their claims as broadly as possible and are in an 
informationally superior position to patent examiners about the specifics of 
their inventions. Thus we should not be surprised when patents containing an 
invention-claim gap emerge from the patent prosecution process, or when 
patentees strategically withhold information from examiners in patent 
prosecution.28 We can address the invention-claim gap more directly by 
improving the patent prosecution process and by revising our rules for 
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25. See Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 3, at 219–20 (discussing ex ante proposals). 
26. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the 
Failure of Festo, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 159, 188–89 (2002) (giving examples of possibilities for 
strategic behavior). 
27. See Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influece in Patent Law, 157 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1965, 1990 (2009) (describing the PTO’s “count system”). 
28. See Wagner, supra note 26, at 214–16 (noting that patent applicants have both the 
incentives and opportunity to withhold information during the patent application process). This is 
different from patentees remaining willfully ignorant about other patents or inventions in the 
field. 
